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I want to thank Jenna Hartel for inviting me to write the afterword to this 
set of papers. She is largely responsible— fifteen years ago when I was a 
visiting professor at UCLA—for introducing me to the rich autonomous 
literature in library and information science (LIS) that relates to my own 
project of “social epistemology” (Fuller 1988). That phrase turns out to 
have been an LIS coinage, though I had not known that when I began my 
project. However, since that time, I have taken a special interest in this 
field—and the field in me (e.g., Zandonade 2004; Fuller 2010).
As someone whose conception of social epistemology is derived mainly 
from philosophy and sociology, the striking feature of the LIS contribu-
tion has always been its preoccupation with the means by which ideas, 
information, and/or knowledge are materially realized. (In what follows, I 
will simply use the word information to capture anything in the noösphere.) 
Both philosophers and sociologists tend to be blind to this feature for 
complementary reasons: philosophers tend to ignore materialization alto-
gether, and sociologists tend to ignore that which is not already material-
ized. In contrast, because librarians and other information professionals 
are typically close to the processing of media—that is, print, audio, and 
video records—they are well placed to deal with the “in between” aspects 
of the ideal/material character of information. In short, they mediate the 
media.
This concern is reasonably seen as being about the embodiment of in-
formation, and historically it has been associated with a universalist ethos 
that aimed to make information available to the widest number of users. 
Indeed, it was this sensibility that linked the mundane tasks of the public 
librarian with the world-historic ambitions of a Paul Otlet. “Embodiment” 
in this sense was about identifying original sources, certifying authorized 
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copies, including translations, and, most importantly, embedding all that 
information (what is now called “metadata”) in a classification system that 
enabled efficient access, whatever the user’s entry point (Wright 2014). In 
this vision, we see LIS’s signature concerns with acquisition, storage, and 
retrieval bound up in one program of research and practice. This original 
sensibility is most clearly represented by Marcia Bates in the assembled 
pieces here, though her frame of reference—informed by cybernetics and 
evolutionary theory—updates it for our own times.
But most of the rest of the pieces are really focused only on embodi-
ment at the information acquisition stage. To be sure, this looks “broad” 
if the opposing view is that information can only be acquired from official 
documents, which is certainly one way in which Otlet’s project has been 
stereotyped. However, as a matter of fact, Otlet wasn’t simply fixated on of-
ficial documents. He wanted LIS professionals to be honest brokers in the 
documentation process itself, which should incorporate consideration of 
the information storage and retrieval phases. This is intellectually interest-
ing work. It is also challenging because, practically speaking, the LIS pro-
fessional must aim for documents that are at once faithful to the original 
source and responsible to the potential user.
From that standpoint, a focus on embodied information simply at the 
point of its initial acquisition is “narrow” because it does no more than 
half the LIS job. To be sure, it is nice to learn that information about 
people’s meaningful activities can be acquired by attending to the various 
sensory modalities that are not normally subject to official documentation. 
But as more seasoned LIS practitioners such as Bates know, this insight is 
not unique to the recent turn to embodiment. A half-century ago, it was 
common to attend to nonverbal behavioral streams in experimental and 
applied psychology. To be sure, there were more data points and fewer 
ontological speculations back then, but the phenomenology was largely 
the same. In any case, the LIS professional should be concerned with 
how such information needs to be encoded and stored so that others who 
are not privy to the original modalities of its acquisition may be able to 
access it.
In this respect, I must concur with Jenna Hartel’s editorial, which po-
litely suggests that LIS’s newfound focus on embodiment may be partly 
misdirected with regard to the field’s deeper professional interests. One 
way to think about this misdirection is that many of the pieces in this 
special issue are written in a way that preserve the esoteric character of 
the original information acquisition phase by stressing its contextual dis-
tinctiveness and even uniqueness. This may be due to the authors’ sense 
of fidelity to their sources and/or their need to mark out intellectual turf 
that they can call their own. However, the net result makes it difficult to 
see how such information could be made accessible to users who have not 
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had or are unlikely to have similar information acquisition experiences. 
Of course, our authors may say that they behave differently when writing 
for academic colleagues and engaging in practical information transfer 
settings. However, the larger politics of this recent turn to embodiment 
also needs to be considered.
As someone with a long institutional memory, I recall the rise of “body 
talk” in Anglophone sociology and cultural studies in the late 1980s as a 
kind of reaction to the “logocentric” focus of both the structuralist and 
poststructuralist theorizing of French academic luminaries of the “sixty-
eighter” generation. Even such great archaeologists and deconstruction-
ists of knowledge as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan were largely concerned 
with rereading the “archive,” understood in a fairly conventional sense of 
documentation, namely, written records. To be sure, it was possible to reg-
ister nondocumented events and experiences—but only as the “unsaid,” 
which still privileged “language” as the primary mode of information 
conveyance, notwithstanding people’s differential access to this privileged 
sense of “language.”
The turn to embodiment by the following generation was thus meant 
to do two things at once: It was designed to open up the modalities in 
which information acquisition officially happens—beyond the production 
of written records. However, as I have already suggested, behaviorists have 
long advocated this, without having to take a detour into recent French 
philosophy. The second thing—the truly distinctive feature of the turn 
to embodiment—is the sense of exclusive ownership that is asserted over 
these nonverbal behavioral streams, which in turn has become the source 
of today’s identity politics.
However, it is not at all clear that LIS can support identity politics in 
this strong sense—at least if it is to remain faithful to Otlet’s universalist 
ambitions. Put pointedly, Otlet regarded the fact that information is al-
ways embodied as the fundamental problem that LIS needs to solve, since 
even in the case of official written records, relatively few people can ever 
gain access to them, let alone be able to contextualize them in a way that 
yields some use value. It is here that LIS was meant to perform a mediat-
ing role, effectively rendering documentation a vehicle of democratiza-
tion. Nevertheless, in the current climate of identity politics, this same 
function can be seen as having a decidedly undemocratic effect. In this 
context, the term expropriation is invoked, since by increasing access to a 
previously esoteric form of knowledge, the LIS professional—at least in 
the Otlet mold—potentially divests the original source of its power over 
how that knowledge is used. While that might serve to reduce the power of 
the powerful, it may also seem to rob the powerless of their only hope for 
power (cf. Fuller 2016a). I don’t share this verdict, but it helps to explain 
the visceral hostility to Otlet’s project by many current LIS scholars, not 
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least Ron Day in this collection (Library Trends 66, no. 3). I shall have more 
to say about his intriguing piece shortly.
To epitomize my point in today’s cyber-parlance: Those LIS practitio-
ners who continue to adhere to Otlet’s terms of engagement are open to 
the idea of information “virtualization,” whereas those whose interest in 
embodied information involves a commitment to identity politics regard 
that prospect as anathema.
Now, let me turn to Ron Day’s contribution, which I read as raising very 
profound issues regarding the embodiment of information, albeit operat-
ing in a mode that seems to be antagonistic to Otlet’s project. At the out-
set, I should say that as someone trained in philosophy, I find philosophi-
cal labels distracting from whatever a nonphilosophical author is trying 
to say. And Day is by no means alone in LIS in disparaging Otlet as both 
an empiricist and an essentialist—two terms that normally mean opposite 
things in philosophy. But none of those philosophical swear words really 
matter to Day’s interesting argument. His pretext is an observed contrast 
between Otlet and Georges Bataille with regard to photography as a form 
of documentation. Bataille is normally seen as a theorist of primitivism, 
violence, and pornography—three terms that I regard nonprejudicially. 
Bataille remains radical even today. But unlike Otlet, who was a lawyer, 
Bataille was actually a librarian, which establishes a prima facie relevance to 
LIS. (By the way, Leibniz and Hume—two early modern philosophers who 
earned a living as librarians—might be seen in a similar fashion by LIS, 
even though Leibniz rationalized the proliferation of reading material, 
while Hume decried it.) So what’s at stake in the contrast?
Otlet believed that information is to documentation as the mind is to 
the brain: on both sides of the analogy, the former term is instantiated by 
the latter. Thus, the information stored as publicly available documents 
are like the “clear and distinct” thoughts registered in some normative ver-
sion of the neural firings in one’s own brain. To be sure, to philosophical 
eyes, Otlet’s vision seems to reinvent Platonism or Cartesianism. He sug-
gests that by possessing a brain, we can—at least in principle—access all of 
mental life. According to Day, Bataille addressed the same issue orthogo-
nally by asking what made the brain such a privileged vehicle in the first 
place. Here the big toe takes center stage. On Bataille’s understanding of 
biological evolution, the big toe is what has enabled us—in contrast to the 
other apes—to stand upright for a significantly long period to support a 
brain as large as ours. This has consequences for understanding photogra-
phy as a vehicle for documentation. After all, photography has functioned 
as a surrogate brain that allows for much better mechanisms of storage 
and retrieval than the brain’s own “mind’s eye” and memory ever could. 
Otlet and Bataille would probably agree on this. However, Day—speaking 
through Bataille—wants us to focus on the contingency of the big toe as the 
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condition for the brain to have developed such that photography has now 
managed to acquire the documentary power that Otlet asserted.
“Contingency” implies that things could have been otherwise—and 
would have been otherwise under different conditions. This is how we 
should understand Bataille as a philosopher of excess. When Bataille fix-
ates on the big toe, he is referring symbolically to the various alternative 
documentary functions of photography that could have developed, had 
this appendage not evolved as it did over so many hundreds of thousands 
years. Had we gone down any of these alternative evolutionary pathways, 
we would now have possessed somewhat differently equipped and posi-
tioned brains to the ones we have now—which may have resulted in al-
ternative normative standards of documentation. “Excess” in this sense 
means unrealized possible worlds or an unexploited potential. A sensitiv-
ity to this state of excess requires a critical attentiveness to the mode in 
which information is normatively embodied. Moreover, Otlet and Bataille 
could at least in principle agree on this point, which is about, following the 
transhumanist literature, information’s “morphological freedom” (Fuller 
2016b). But this literature ultimately involves exploring modes of infor-
mation embodiment in a way that puts Otlet and Bataille on the same 
side—as against the more proprietary approach to information favored by 
today’s identity politics advocates.
To conclude, the pieces assembled in these two special issues of Library 
Trends bring out very clearly information’s multiple modes of embodiment 
and the variety of methods that are needed to acquire proper access to 
them. Taken together, they demonstrate the breadth of scholarly activity 
currently at play in LIS, a credit to all the authors. The question now fac-
ing the writers—and readers—of these papers is how to ensure that they 
contribute to the core mission and values of the LIS field.
References
Fuller, S. 1988. Social Epistemology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
———. 2010. “Social Epistemology.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science, 
edited by M. Bates and M. Maack, 4799–4805. London: Routledge.
———. 2016a. “The Place of Value in a World of Information: Prolegomena to any Marx 
2.0.” In Social Epistemology and Technology, edited by F. Scalambrino, 15–26. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield.
———. 2016b. “Morphological Freedom and the Question of Responsibility and Representa-
tion in Transhumanism.” Confero 4 (2): 33–45.
Wright, A. 2014. Cataloguing the World: Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Zandonade, T. 2004. “Social epistemology from Jesse Shera to Steve Fuller.” Library Trends 
52 (4): 810–32.
Steve Fuller is Auguste Comte Professor of Social Epistemology in the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Warwick, UK. Originally trained in history and philoso-
594 library trends/spring 2018
phy of science, Fuller is best known for his foundational work in the field of “social 
epistemology,” which is the name of a quarterly journal that he founded in 1987 as 
well as the first of his more than twenty books. From 2011 to 2014 he published a 
trilogy relating to the idea of a “post-” or “trans-” human future, all published with 
Palgrave Macmillan under the rubric of “Humanity 2.0.” His most recent books are 
Knowledge: The Philosophical Quest in History (Routledge 2015), The Academic Caesar 
(Sage 2016), and Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game (Anthem 2018). His works 
have been translated into over twenty languages. He was awarded a D.Litt. by the 
University of Warwick in 2007 for sustained lifelong contributions to scholarship.
